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WHAT'S A WOMAN TO DO?: A LOOK AT PRIVATE CHILD
SUPPORT AGREEMENTS IN VIRGINIA
NICOLE SPAIN
Over the years, state legislatures drastically changed family
law guidelines in order to protect the interest of mothers and their
children.' This phenomenon occurred in part because of a paradigm
shift in belief about the rights of mothers and their dependent
children.2 In the past, the law recognized children as property of
their fathers, but today mothers have input and control over issues
regarding their children, especially post-divorce.3 As a result of the
history and treatment of women in the past, state legislatures and
courts, including the Virginia Legislature, developed and upheld
statutes concerning child custody and child support that are gender
neutral.4 Women benefit more from these statutes, however,
because courts award most women physical custody of the children
post-divorce.5 The Virginia Legislature established child support
guidelines to keep mothers and children out of poverty post-divorce
and to ensure that fathers remained at least financially responsible
for their children.6 These guidelines are important because the
Legislature did not think that all private agreements created
between parents sufficiently protected women and their children.7
As a result, Virginia courts invalidated many private agreements in
favor of the statutory guidelines.8 Virginia courts also held that the
1. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)
(discussing the cultural reasons for society's change in view that women are less than equal
partners in marriage).
2. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 16-18 (1994).
3. Id. at xv.
4. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, 20-108.2 (Michie 2001), for a look at child support
statutes that refer to the parents as parties. The statutes' drafters do not presume the gender
of the custodial parent.
5. See MASON, supra note 2, at 16-17.
6. See Kelly v. Kelly, No. 7952, 1993 WL 946122, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 21, 1993).
7. See id.
8. E.g., Shoup v. Shoup, 542 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (holding divorced parties
may not automatically modify a support order without court approval); Riggins v. O'Brien, 538
S.E.2d 320, 324 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding parties must gain court approval of support
modifications); Solomond v. Ball, 470 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a court
could not issue an order which automatically changes the support amount); Goodpasture v.
Goodpasture, 371 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that parties, by their own
agreement, could not modify the terms of the support order); Kelly v. Kelly, No. 7952, 1993
WL 946122, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 21, 1993) (holding a party may not unilaterally reduce
a support amount). These cases represent that Virginia courts consider modification of
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courts may not order an automatic future increase or decrease in
support.9
Richard Byrd, member of the Virginia Bar Association's
Coalition Committee on Family Law Legislation, proposed amend-
ments to statutes sections 20-108.1 and 20-108.2 of the Virginia
Code to address the above issue as they relate to agreements
between parties settling child support issues.10 His proposed
amendments will require courts to meet the same standard in
overturning divorce agreements, as the court now must meet to
deviate from the presumptive guidelines."
Part I of this note will explore the effect divorce has on women
and the reasons why women have less bargaining power than men
do. Part II will provide an analysis of Virginia's current child
support statutes and Virginia courts assessment of unapproved
private agreements. Part III will provide an analysis of the
proposed amendments. Finally, Part IV will discuss the probable
effect of the proposed amendments on women, if adopted.
I. EFFECTS OF DIVORCE ON WOMEN
Western society regarded women throughout history as the
weaker sex.' 2 Society structured women's lives to ensure their
dependency on men.'3 Women had no legal identity of their own.'4
While women's fathers, and later their husbands, would be their
voices, those men did not necessarily communicate the ideas and
feelings of the women they purported to represent. Society pushed
women into the background. 5 The public sphere was uninviting of
female involvement.1 6 As a result, women became financially and
many times psychologically dependent on their husbands. 7 If
husbands were good providers, women did not have to worry about
supporting themselves and their children. Husbands were responsi-
ble for maintaining a comfortable standard of living for their
support awards by the parties against public policy. Parties must petition the court whenever
there is a substantial change in circumstances. The noncustodial parent is not entitled to any
credits for overpayment based on any private modification agreement.
9. Keyser v. Keyser, 345 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Proposed Amendment 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2
(Proposed Amendment 2001).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Proposed Amendment 2001).
12. See, e.g., ANTONIA FRASER, THE WEAKER VESSEL 1 (1984).
13. MASON, supra note 2, at 14-15.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 14-15.
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families."8 This approach to marital life worked out well, in a sense,
when marriages lasted "until death do us part." Today, however,
when people complain about the loss of family values and high
divorce rates, 9 women take a great risk relying on the old approach
to marital life. Today, women continue to play the more traditional
role of wife and mother, performing at least twice the amount of
routine housework as their male counterparts." Unfortunately,
divorce settlement negotiations do not fully protect women's
interests."
The Financial Effect of Divorce
Divorce devastates many women financially.22 Divorce often
results in a drastic decline from the marital standard of living,
which often leaves women and their dependent children impover-
ished.23 Although divorce decrees concerning distribution of
property, child custody, and child support have improved over
time,24 they still need reformation.25 Most marriages that end in
divorce occur while the couples still have minor children.26 Alone,
18. Id. at 13.
19. See Arland Thornton, Comparative and Historical Perspectives on Marriage, Divorce,
and Family Life, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 587, 595 (1994) (predicting that one half of all marriages
in the United States will end in divorce) (citing ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,
REMARRIAGE, 24 (1992) and Larry L. Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family, Interactions
Between Demographic and Institutional Change, 1990 Presidential Address before the
Population Association of America, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 485 (1990)). See also Gary B.
Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL L. REV.
1993, 2011 n.87 (1993) (noting that two-thirds of all marriages will end in divorce or
separation) (citing Teresa Castro Martin & Larry L. Bumpass, Recent Trends in Marital
Disruption, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 40-41 (1989)).
20. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Vacant Promises?: The ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution and the Post-Divorce Financial Circumstances of Women, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POLVY 167, 170 (2001) [hereinafter Vacant Promises] (citing Scott Coltrane, Research on
Household Labor: Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work,
62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1208, 1212 (2000)).
21. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women's Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1238 (1999) [hereinafter Women's Freedom].
22. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, ch. 5, § 5.05 cmt. c. (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997).
23. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1155.
24. Marsha Garrison, Equitable Distribution in New York: Results and Reform: Good
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621,627 (1991) [hereinafter Equitable Distribution]. Garrison
notes that the reformation in divorce law was primarily to benefit women. Id. Equitable
distribution is meant to divide property equitably, ensuring that both spouses are properly
protected. Id. at 627-28.
25. Vacant Promises, supra note 20, at 167.
26. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1157.
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supporting children, and normally with a lower earning capacity
than before the marriage, many women's financial status drops
significantly, while their former husbands experience an increase in
income.27 Because in most homes women are the primary caretak-
ers of the children, women's access to the marketplace is
restricted.28 Women's families often come before their careers,
making it difficult to establish an economic identity of their own.2"
As a result, women who do work often earn less than their male
counterparts. ° Women's roles as caretakers often make career
advancement difficult as well.3 '
Two solutions to divorcing women's plights are temporary child
support and spousal support orders. The court awards orders to
help women meet their basic needs until a final support order,
reflecting more accurately the amount of support due, ii issued.32
An all too common problem is that it may take months for a court to
order temporary support and when the court does, many husbands
simply ignore the order.33 A harsh reality is that women whom find
themselves financially dependent on their husbands during
marriage are often at their husbands' mercy during and after
divorce.
The Psychological Effect of Divorce
The mental state of women is important when dealing with
divorce settlements. The fact that many women cannot afford
attorneys34 to represent them, and if they can, their attorneys are
27. For a discussion on the disparity between former spouses' income, see Equitable
Distribution, supra note 24, at 720-23 tbl. 55. Garrison notes that the average post-divorce
per capital income of wives and children approximates sixty-eight percent of their before-
divorce per capita income, whereas the per capita income of husbands increases one-hundred
eighty-two percent after divorce. Id.
28. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1172.
29. Id.
30. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
371, 386-87 (2001). Kessler's article addresses why law has failed to solve women's burdens
in regard to the workplace and family.
31. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1172.
32. See id. at 1173.
33. Id. at 1173-74.
34. Id. at 1175-80. Bryan writes that many women, because of their economic instability
and dependency, often cannot afford to fight long, drawn out, legal battles. As a result,
women's financial situations force them to represent themselves, hire inadequate or
unconcerned counsels, or accept joint representation by lawyers that their husbands chose.
These women are very susceptive to legal maneuvers that prolong the divorce process with
the hopes of forcing them to settle for any settlement that their husbands offer. Bryon writes
that this tactic is commonly referred to as "starving her out."
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often not as highly skilled as their husbands' attorneys,5 severely
impedes women's abilities to negotiate. Serious emotional issues
also restrict women's capacity to negotiate. 36 There is always a fear
that women will not use their best judgment and surrender to what
their husbands dictate. Even during divorce, when theoretically
women are gaining their freedom, they remain submissive to men.
Several factors lead women to have such a psychologically
difficult time during divorce, which in turn make negotiations
difficult.3" One factor is naive trust.38 To their detriment, many
women believe that their husbands, lawyers, and the legal system
will deal with them fairly and provide adequately for them after
dissolution.39 Women do not secure their own interest because they
believe that others will do that for them.40 In addition, old habits
die hard. After years of marriage and dependency, many women are
ignorant about their marital financial circumstances.4' They are
used to their husbands dealing with monetary concerns.4 2 At the
time of divorce, many women simply accept the financial situation
that their husbands tell them.43 Trusting that those figures are
accurate, many women negotiate without realizing the true extent
of the marital assets.4 4 Unfortunately, however, for those women
35. Id. at 1175. See, e.g., KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE: THEABUSE OF WOMEN
AND CHILDREN BY DIVORCE LAWYERS AND JUDGES 13 (1996). Winner states:
The man who controls the family's money-and his wife's share-is in position
financially and legally to overpower his spouse in the divorce proceeding. In
1991 Barbara L. Paltrow, President of the Nassau County Women's Bar
Association, described the prototypical case in a letter to her peers: "He had
access to high priced legal talent from the start, access to lawyers who knew how
to use the system to great and often unfair advantage. The wife, on the other
hand, quickly discovered that most lawyers would not represent her on the
promise of getting paid, eventually, from family resources controlled by the
husband. In order to have any representation these women had to exhaust their
life savings, if they had any, and borrow to the hilt from family or friends. Even
this was rarely enough to pay for the protracted litigation forced upon them."
Id. See also Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 803, 810 (1990) (noting that many lawyers prefer to represent husbands in divorce
proceedings because they have greater access to financial resources).
36. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1186.
37. Id. at 1180.
38. Id. at 1181.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 52-
93 (1983) (noting that the husband has control over the marital resources of the family
because he possesses things of value to the outside world, such as wages and prestige).
42. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1173.
43. Id. at 1182.
44. Id. at 1177.
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that are not totally convinced of their husbands' honesty, lack of
financial resources makes it difficult to learn the truth.45
Two other factors to consider are loss of self-esteem and
depression.46 In a world where society constantly bombards women
with images of how they should look, the way should think, and the
role they should play in society, it is no wonder that women
commonly suffer from these conditions. Divorce can create or
intensify these conditions.47 Suddenly forced to reevaluate their
lives and provide for themselves and their children, divorcing
women face mental turmoil." These women's situations worsen
when they are also financially destitute.49 Women who lose their
places as dependent wives and find themselves independent
mothers, who must protect their own interest after realizing that no
one else will do so,5° have a right to feel overwhelmed.
One solution to the problem might be remarriage. The
standard of living of divorce a women normally rises with remar-
riage.5 The probability of remarriage declines, however, as a
woman grows older.52 Many women never remarry and many of
those women who do remarry out of economic hardship find
themselves in poor relationships with the potential for abuse.53 In
addition, the time between divorce and remarriage may severely
impact women's and children's lives.54 Imagine after years of
marriage, in which women may become economically dependent,
divorce may grant them independence, but their needs may go
unmet. Couple the above premise with the fact that the most
probable way of returning to their old status quo is to remarry and
once again become dependent on a man. The chances of that are
45. Id. at 1177. Byran notes-that even if women try to discern the correct facts about
marital assets their attempts may fail because of lack of resources. She notes that discovery
is expensive, especially when trying to ferret out assets that their husbands deliberately
conceal or misrepresent. Without conducting a proper and thorough discovery, women cannot
possibly negotiate effectively. Their husbands all too often have the upper hand, once again
leaving women at the mercy of their former spouse. Bryan goes on to note that even when
discovery is successful and women identify all marital assets, appraisals are another problem.
It is not enough for women to know what property is owned, women must also know what
their assets are worth. For women with limited financial resources retaining experts for this
duty is expensive. Id.
46. Id. at 1186-87.
47. Id. at 1186.
48. Id. at 1186.
49. Id. at 1186.
50. Id. at 1183.
51. Id. at 1168.
52. Vacant Promise, supra note 20, at 172.
53. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1168.
54. Id.
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slim, and it does not leave much hope for divorced women. This
thought is enough to make anyone depressed.
Divorce and Property Division
Property division is one way in which women can gain security
post-divorce.55 In most states, martial property is subject to
equitable distribution.56 An equitable distribution standard is
favored because it theoretically provides that both spouses will
share equally and fairly in the marital assets.57 On the surface,
equitable distribution seems like a beneficial standard for women,
but many scholars suggest that at times equitable distribution is
unfair or ineffectively applied.5" Judges often use their own
discretion and deviate from the award amount that the equitable
distribution standard dictates.59 All too often women end up
receiving fewer of the marital assets than do men.6°
What about women that need more? Women's chances of
receiving more than half of the marital property declined because of
equitable distribution.6' Women who earn less money or have a
lower earning capacity than their husbands may need more of the
marital assets just to maintain the marital standard of living.
Marriage is definitely a partnership, but divorce appears to be every
man and woman for himself or herself.
The Risk of Losing Custody
It is only natural for women, who still fill the traditional role as
mothers, to seek custody of their children after divorce. Women are
still the primary homemakers62 and as such develop an intense bond
with their children that they fear will dissolve post-divorce.63
55. Id. at 1215.
56. Id.
57. See IRA MARKELLMAN ET AL., FAMILYLAW: CASES,TEXT, PROBLEMS, 234 (3rd ed. 1991)
(noting that some equitable distribution states have presumption of equal division of marital
assets, but women are still receiving few marital assets than men).
58. See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory ofAlimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2227, 2251 (1994) (noting the presumption that the "he who earned it owns it" rule).
59. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis
of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401,452-58 (1996). See generally Suzanne
Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to
Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (1988).
60. Vacant Promises, supra note 20, at 176.
61. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1216.
62. Id. at 1192.
63. Id.
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Historically, fathers had all legal rights to the children after
divorce. 4 Modern history, however, favors mothers, who are the
primary caretakers." Within the last few decades, father's groups
fought to have this presumption overturned.66 Today, it is a
substantial reality that women may lose custody of their children to
their husbands." This new trend leaves any woman vulnerable."s
Scared that they will lose custody of their children, many women
agree to financial terms that are not in their or their children's best
interest just to avoid prolonged custody battles.69 These proceedings
are often expensive and nerve-wracking."v A woman's anxieties
heighten vl with the knowledge that many states favor joint custody
because of an assumption that joint custody is in the best interest
of the child. 2 Many states also employ a friendly parent provision
in their child custody guidelines.73 States intended to place fathers
on the same playing field as mothers with the best interest of the
child standard and friendly parent provision.74 These two factors
reduce women's chances of a successful custody battle.7"
II. ANALYSIS OF VIRGINIA'S CURRENT CHILD SUPPORT STATUTES
Virginia enacted its child support laws, sections 20-108.1 and
20-108.2,76 in order to ensure that both parents honored their duty
to support their children.77 The Virginia Legislature views two
64. MASON, supra note 2, at 16-18.
65. Id. at 63-64.
66. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1193.
67. Id. at 1200.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1201.
70. Id. at 1200.
71. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455,
455-57 (1984). Joint custody is the term for shared legal and physical custody of children by
divorced or separated parents. The purpose of joint custody is to ensure that both parents
maintain an active relationship with the child. The authors note that most states favor joint
custody. Between 1975 and 1983, twenty-nine states adopted joint custody laws. But see
Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201,
201-02 (1998) (noting that at first judges resisted joint custody laws). In California, 68.8
percent of judges disfavored joint custody commenting that joint custody, creates too many
problems, such as poor parental cooperation, instability of the child, distance between
parental home and revenge. Id. (citing Thomas J. Reidy et al., Child Custody Decisions: A
Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75, 80 (1989)).
72. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 71, at 457.
73. Women's Freedom, supra note 21, at 1193.
74. Id. at 1194.
75. Id. 1195.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Michie 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Michie 2001).
77. See Kelly v. Kelly, No. 7952, 1993 WL 946122, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 21, 1993).
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parents whom are both supporting their children in the "best
interest of the child.""8 The statutes provide the courts with certain
factors and formulas to consider when ordering a support decree.79
In order to deviate from the guidelines the party must provide
evidence that such a deviation is appropriate in his or her particular
case. Section 20-108.2 A of the Virginia Code states:
There shall be a rebuttable presumption in any judicial or
administrative proceeding for child support under this title or
Title 16.1 or Title 63.1, including cases involving split custody or
shared custody, that the amount of the award which would
result from the application of the guidelines set forth in this
section is the correct amount of child support to be awarded. In
order to rebut the presumption, the court shall make written
findings in the order set out in §20-108.1, which findings may be
incorporated by reference, that the application of the guidelines
would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case as deter-
mined by relevant evidence pertaining to the factors set out in
§§ 20-107.2 and 20-108.1.' 0
The rebuttable presumption provision of the statutes allow for some
flexibility. The provisions allow the parties to justify why the
support award should be increased or decreased from the amount
calculated through the schedule set out in section 20-108.2."'
Section 20-108.1 provides eighteen factors that the court can take
into account when determining whether the support award should
deviate from the guidelines.8 2 By giving the parties a chance to
address specific circumstances involved in their case, the court may
render a decree that both parties may view as fair and accurate.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1B (Michie 2001).
79. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, 20-108.2 (Michie 2001).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2A (Michie 2001).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2B (Michie 2001) (determining child support need by looking
at the combined gross income of both parents compared with the number of children entitled
to support).
82. VA. CODE ANN. §20-108.1B (Michie 2001). Three of the factors are of particular
importance. Factor 3 allows the court to impute income to the noncustodial parent if the court
deems that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily under-employed. Factor 10
allows the court to consider the standard of living that was established during the marriage
and factor 16 allows the court to consider a written agreement between the parties that
includes a child support amount. Factors 3 and 10 determine the legislature's commitment
to maintaining that noncustodial parents at least provide their fair share of their children's
needs as well as maintain children's financial stability. Factor 10 allows the court to
recognize private agreement, but as evident from the case law, it does not influence courts
very much.
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Court Approval, Private Agreements, and Modification
Virginia courts have stressed, in its child support jurisprudence,
the importance of court approval before parties can modify their
child support awards.' In Goodpasture v. Goodpasture,4 both
parents agreed that the court awarded child support would discon-
tinue during the period that the mother was out of the state with
the child.8" The mother moved back to Virginia, but the father
never resumed paying the court awarded child support.8 6 The
father, however, still supported the child financially in an amount
less than the court award.87 The mother eventually sued the father
for arrearages dating back to when she first moved out of the state.'
The court held the father in contempt for past due child support
stating:
Parties cannot contractually modify the terms of a support order
without the court's approval.... Should circumstances change
requiring alteration in the amount of support, a party's remedy
is to apply to the court for relief.... The payor has the obligation
to pay the specified amounts according to the terms of a support
order and cannot vary these terms to suit his or her convenience.
To allow a party to make payments other than as specified in the
support order would lead to continuous trouble and turmoil.
Furthermore, it would substitute the self-determined interests
of one or both of the parties over the court-determined best
interests of the child.89
Goodpasture reflects Virginia's public policy to ensure that the best
interest of the child is met. The case also demonstrates the court's
unwillingness to allow parents to decide without the court's scrutiny
a satisfactory amount of support. Goodpasture is one prominent
case that sets the stage for Virginia's child support jurisprudence.
Not only do Virginia courts require court approval before
parties may modify their child support amount, but they also
display hesitancy in honoring initial private agreements. In Kelly
v. Kelly,9 ° the Virginia Circuit Court invalidated a private agree-
ment that set the monthly child support owed below the minimum
83. See supra note 8.
84. 371 S.E. 2d 845.
85. Id. at 846.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 847-48 (citations omitted).
90. 1993 WL 946122, at *1.
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amount of support determined by section 20-108.2. 9' The agreement
permitted Mr. Kelly to pay $125 per month per child.92 The court,
however, calculated that, under the guidelines, with the information
provided by the parties, Mr. Kelly's support obligation was $140 per
month per child.93 The court, therefore, imputed income to Mr.
Kelly, ruling that he was voluntarily under-employed.94 In the
instant case, the court ignored the private agreement between the
parties in favor of the guideline figures. By invalidating the
agreement and imputing income to Mr. Kelly, the court enforced the
same public policy arguments set forth in Goodpasture.
Virginia courts are not only willing to invalidate initial private
agreements between parents and agreements that modify the
court's mandated award, but Virginia courts are also willing to place
checks on the amount of authority the courts themselves have on
modification. In Keyser v. Keyser, 5 the Virginia Court of Appeals
reversed a provision from an order provided by the Circuit Court
that allowed the father's obligation to be subject to a yearly
automatic adjustment.96 The adjustment was to reflect any increase
or decrease in his salary.97 The Court of Appeals held that a clause
allowing for an automatic change in the support amount was an
abuse of the court's discretion. The court noted that:
[alny change in the amount of the husband's child support
obligation should result from a change in the parties' circum-
stances and be based upon a consideration of the factors set
forth in Code § 20-107.2... The statutory scheme provided by
the General Assembly does not contemplate automatic changes
or escalator clauses.98
The court makes it clear that courts should review any modifica-
tions of support at the time the parties' circumstances substantially
change.
Although Keyser pre-dates the enactment of sections 20-108.1
and 20-108.2 of the Virginia Code, its holding has still been
followed. In Solomond v. Ball,99 the trial court, instead of ordering
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 345 S.E.2d 12.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 13.
98. Id. at 14.
99. 470 S.E.2d 157.
20031
306 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 9:295
a specific support amount, set the father's support obligation as a
percentage of his children's educational needs.' ° The Court of
Appeals invalidated the order on the same grounds that it reversed
the order in Keyser.' The court noted "[a] trial court may not
abrogate its responsibility to determine that a material change of
circumstances justifies a modification of child support by entering
an order that results in an automatic increase in the support
obligation upon the occurrence of future events." °2 Keyser and
Solomond demonstrate Virginia's public policy to ensure that the
courts adjudicate any request for child support modifications.
Along the same lines, as the many cases before it, Shoup v.
Shoup °3 appears to uphold Virginia's child support modification
jurisprudence. In Shoup, the parties had in their final divorce
decree a self-executing clause that allowed the father to reduce the
amount of support required by section 20-108.2 of the Virginia Code
until each child either died, married, became self-supporting,
reached eighteen years old, or was emancipated. °4 As provided in
the clause, the father unilaterally reduced the child support amount
as each child turned eighteen years old.' °5 On petition, the trial
court held the father in contempt of court and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.' 6 The Court of Appeals once again held that
a self-executing child support modification was invalid and that the
noncustodial parent remains responsible for the full amount of the
court-mandated support. 0 7 The court stated that:
[t]he prevailing and well-established principle of law requiring
contemporaneous court approval of modification has not been
diminished or eroded by the Commonwealth's public policy
favoring "prompt resolution of disputes concerning the mainte-
nance and care of minor children.... [Plarents cannot contract
away their children's rights to support, any provision which
100. Id. at 160.
101. Id. ("Determination of support awards must be based on contemporary circumstances
and modified in the future as changes in circumstances occur.") (quoting Keyserv. Keyser, 345
S.E.2d 12, 13 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)). See also Kelley, 449 S.E.2d at 56-57 (holding unilateral,
automatic, or agreed-upon child support modifications are void and unenforceable without
court approval).
102. Solomond, 470 S.E.2d at 160.
103. 542 S.E.2d 9.
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id. at 14.
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impinges upon the rights of children to support is void, and a
decree which incorporates such provision is likewise void."'8
The Shoup decision struck another blow to advocates of private
agreements.
Judge Benton, who wrote the dissent in Shoup, noted that it
was unnecessary for the parties to return to court because the court
had no jurisdiction to award support for children that reach their
majority.'0 9 In addition, the self-executing clause still required the
use of the guidelines to determine the modified amount. 10 Why
then should the parties return to court for approval for modifica-
tion? Virginia's public policy encourages the agreements between
parents about their minor children."' Judge Benton stated:
I believe that our cases do not bar the parties from agreeing to
voluntarily modify their child support payments annually
according to Code s 20-108.2 .... Yet, it appears from the
majority opinion that members of the Bar should be placed on
noticed that despite good faith efforts to resolve amicably the
child support arrangements by agreements that incorporate the
schedules of Code § 20-108.2, the parties have no safe harbor
and can only protect themselves by filing in court a petition to
seek modification for any change in circumstance that has been
recognized and specifically identified in their court-approved
agreement." 2
Judge Benton's dissent allows the parties to have more flexibility,
thereby giving parents more control over the amount of support.
Up until this point in time, Virginia courts were very clear in
their requirement for court approval in order to modify a support
order. Practitioners were surprised when a few months after the
Court of Appeals decided Shoup it reheard the case en banc. This
time the court recognized the enforceability of private agreements
without court approval."' Surprisingly, the court agreed with Judge
Benton's public policy argument."' The court reasoned that
108. Id. at 13 (quoting Kelley v. Kelley, 449 S.E.2d 55, 56-57 (Va. 1994); Morris v. Morris,
219 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Va. 1975)).
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 16.
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id. at 17.
113. Id. at 785.
114. Id. at 789.
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requiring court approval for private agreements ultimately weak-
ened Virginia's prompt resolution policy."' The court wrote:
[wie are aware of neither holding nor statute that requires a
trial court to hear evidence on the matter of child support where
the parties have agreed to the amount of support and do not
seek the court's determination ofthe matter.... [T]he resources
of both the court and the parties would be wasted by requiring
a trial judge to sua sponte require parties to litigate a settled
matter.'16
The court's conclusion is that even though the courts cannot award
support based on future circumstances, the parties may agree to
future modifications as circumstances change. This public policy
encourages both parents to cooperate and promotes an efficient use
of judicial resources.
The second ruling in Shoup changed the court's long established
jurisprudence requiring court-approved modification. The court
validated self-executing clauses to which the parties agreed.
Approximately two months after the second Court of Appeals
Shoup decision the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Riggins v.
O'Brien."7 In Riggins, the parties had a self-executing clause that
allowed the father to reduce the amount of support when the
children died, reached eighteen years of age, became self-support-
ing, or requested emancipation."' The decree went on to state that
the amount payable for child support "shall be renegotiated or
submitted to a court for adjudication on the first event of emancipa-
tion.""9 The father argued that the clause allowed him to unilater-
ally reduce the support amount without court approval. 20 The
Virginia Supreme Court, however, interpreted the above quoted
provision to mean that the parties could either provide the court
with a new agreed upon support amount for approval or could
petition the court to adjudicate the matter.'2 ' Ultimately, the court
decided in favor of court approval before the parties may recalculate
any support award. The court stated that "as was the case with the
original negotiation, any renegotiation would be subject to court
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 481 S.E.2d 482, 485-86 (1997)).
117. 2002 Va. LEXIS 31, at *1 (Va. Mar. 1, 2002).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Riggins v. O'Brien, 538 S.E.2d at 322.
121. Riggins 2002 Va. LEXIS 31, at *7.
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approval. We think this requirement is implicit in the divorce
court's decree."
122
III. A LOOK AT THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in Riggins may confuse
advocates, such as family mediators, who are supportive of the
Court of Appeals second decision in Shoup.23 The Riggins decision
also has other practitioners questioning the future of private court
unapproved agreements in Virginia's child support jurisprudence.
James A. Watson II, who represented Mrs. O'Brien, stated, "time
will tell, but I think the opinion really calls into question the
continued validity of Shoup. I think Shoup is severely undermined
by this decision. " 124 As a result of the conflict between the Virginia
Supreme Court in Riggins and the Virginia Court of Appeals in
Shoup, a statutory amendment to the child support statutes sections
20-108.1 and 20-108.2 may be necessary. Richard Bryd's proposed
amendments to sections 20-108.1 and 20-108.2 aim to end the
conflict.'25 Byrd's proposal, however, will in a sense codify the en
banc decision in Shoup. Byrd's goal is for Virginia courts to meet
the same standard in overturning private agreements, as it must to
deviate from the presumptive guidelines. 26  Byrd proposed two
important changes to the statutes. His first change is for private
agreements to follow contract principles. The proposed amendment
states:
B.2.(b) In any judicial or administrative proceeding for child
support, the parties may agree as to how they are each to
provide for the financial needs of their children. Such agree-
ments may include child support amounts and the terms and
conditions of payment, and may provide for direct payment to
persons providing goods or services to a child, and may provide
as to how such support will change in the future as the circum-
stances of the parties and children may change. The formation
and construction rules applied to such contracts or agreements
122. Id. at *8-9.
123. For a discussion on how Shoup benefits family mediation, see Shoup v. Shoup,
RESOLUTIONS (Mar. 2002), available at
httpJ/www.courts.state.va.us/drs/resolutions/march2002/shoup.html.
124. John D. Tuerck, Dad Owes Back Support Despite Pact In Decree, VIRGINIA LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Mar. 11, 2002, at 1.
125. See Letter from Richard Byrd, Attorney, Virginia Bar Association, to Virginia Bar
Association Coalition (July 25, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Bar Association Coalition
Committee of Family Law Legislation).
126. Id.
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shall be the same as the rules applied to other contracts. If a
written stipulation or contract regarding child support is filed
with the court or administrative agency, or is embodied in a
consent order or decree endorsed by counsel or the parties, then
such agreement or consent order will be presumed to be the
correct amount of child support to be awarded. In order to rebut
this presumption, the court shall make written findings in an
order, which findings may be incorporated by reference, that the
terms of the parties' agreement, stipulation or consent order
would be unjust or inappropriate as determined by relevant
evidence pertaining to the factors set forth in Section B.2.(a)
above, and giving due regard to the other considerations set
forth in the agreement or consent order of the parties.'27
By applying contract principles to these agreements, parties are
bound by their word and cannot petition the court for arrearage that
conflicts with their agreements. This change to the statute also
presumes that the amount is correct and the court must make a
written finding to deviate from the agreement. 128
The second important change to the statute allows the parties
to determine the amount of future support. Section B.2.(d) of the
proposed amendment states:
B.2.(d) Upon a finding by the court of a material change in
circumstances since the previous determination of support set
forth in an existing agreed order, the court shall determine
whether in the existing order, the parties provided for the means
to determine future changes in support with respect to the
demonstrated material change in circumstances.
(i) If the parties did, in the existing support order, provide the
means, method or formula for determining a new child support
amount considering the demonstrated changed circumstances
[in support with respect to the demonstrated material changed
circumstances], then those provisions will be presumed to be the
correct method of determining the new child support provisions
to be awarded.129
This part of the proposal forces the courts to accept provisions
that the parties already agreed to about future support. In the
absence, however, of a preconceived agreement about future
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 B.2(b)(Proposed Amendment 2001).
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 B.2(b)(Proposed Amendment 2001).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 B.2(d)-B.2(d)(i)(Proposed Amendment 2001).
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support, section B.2.(d) allows the court to presume that the support
amount determined by the schedule in section 20-108.2 is correct.
1 30
This proposal will nullify years of case law. It will weaken the
power that courts have to modify support orders. Although there
are many who will support its passage, 131 a question remains as to
how the proposals actually will affect divorce proceedings. Perhaps,
more importantly, the question remains as to how the proposals
actually will affect women in divorce proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Richard Byrd's proposed amendments to the Virginia child
support statutes will foster Virginia's public policy for prompt
resolutions. Divorcing couples, especially women, can significantly
save money by avoiding lengthy court proceedings every time there
is a material change in circumstances. Women and their children,
however, will pay a tremendous price if the General Assembly
adopts his proposal. The main problem is ensuring that women
want these agreements and that the amendments are in the best
interest of women and their children. Presumably, requiring the
court to meet the same standard in overturning these agreements
as it does the child support presumptive guidelines will protect
mothers against coercion and the interest of the child. Standard
commercial contract principles, however, may not be able to take
into account how highly emotional and vulnerable women are when
dealing with support issues. Instead of the courts at least having
the ability to protect women, even if it sometimes seems that courts
do not, Virginia courts might have to rule a "deal is a deal." Even
though Byrd's proposals include a rebuttable presumption that
these agreements are correct, private agreements may be rubber-
stamped. Virginia should not be willing to take this risk.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 B.2(d)(ii)(Proposed Amendment 2001).
131. Tuerck, supra note 120, at 4. Glenn C. Riggins, who represented Riggins, stated:
[Wihen Shoup was decided in en banc there were patrons in the legislature
prepared to make amendments to ensure that these agreements were respected.
The General Assembly was going to fix the problem made by the court. The
courts apparently fixed the problem. And now, with the end of the session, we
are absolutely back in a hopeless situation.
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